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                                                                   Abstract
A two-country, two-period model of international migration highlights 
microeconomic foundations for examining the interrelation between brain drain, brain 
gain and the location of human capital formation, at home or abroad.  Ex ante choices 
regarding where to study depend on relative qualities of university systems, individuals’ 
abilities, sunk educational investment costs, government grants, and expected 
employment prospects in both countries.  The analysis underscores an inherently wide-
range of conceivable positive or negative effects on domestic net welfare.  These changes 
depend critically on the foregoing factors, as well as the optimal design of educational 
grant schemes, given eventual informational imperfections regarding individuals’ 
capabilities. 
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Section I:  Introduction
Spawned, notably, by the contribution of Bhagwati and Hamada 
(1974), there has now been considerable research concern regarding the 
potentially adverse impact, for a home country’s growth and welfare, of the 
migration of skilled workers.  Nonetheless, early investigations also 
recognized potentially advantageous effects for source countries, due to 
possible remittances and the eventual return of migrants with enhanced 
skills due to foreign job training.  More recently, what Schiff (2006) has 
termed the “new brain drain literature”, which was initiated by Mountford 
(1997) and Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997), has identified another 
potentially important source of brain gain, which is independent from return 
migration.  Specifically, although migration can generate a loss of domestic 
talent, it can also prompt an upsurge in the overall educational level of a 
home country, as a result of higher propensities to invest in human capital.  
Attractive foreign labour market conditions offer heightened incentives for 
domestic workers to strive to attain higher qualification levels, whether or 
not they ultimately find jobs abroad, thereby fostering, ceteris paribus,
increases in average productivity levels at home. 
While certain existing approaches to modelling brain drain and brain 
gain effects entail macroeconomic frameworks with representative agents, as 
in Vidal (1998), many also consider microeconomic decisions at the level of 
individual agents, including choices regarding optimal investment levels in 
education.  Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997) have proposed a 
framework, which demonstrates how, given the opportunity to migrate, 
choices regarding educational attainment will determine an individual’s 
wage on the foreign labour market.  In other modelling frameworks, as 
proposed by Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1998), the potential 
migrant takes into account a probability of finding a job abroad, which is 
identical for all individuals, or, as in Stark (2004), constrained by a 
minimum threshold level of qualification.  Mountford (1997) and Beine, 
Docquier, and Rapoport (2001, 2008)) propose models where an individual’s 
decision is of a binary form – whether to undertake education or not, while 
the probability of finding foreign employment is exogenous.  This does not 
allow a role for differences in individuals’ characteristics, so that migrants 
are randomly selected.  In contrast, Chiswick (1999) provides for self-
selection by migrants, since, assuming two categories of individuals, the rate 
of return to migration is greater for those with high-ability, relative to lower-
ability persons.  Nonetheless, the literature has principally focused on the 
links between incentives to invest in human capital at home and subsequent 
migration flows.     
The evaluation of brain drain/brain gain effects is made in the 
literature by assessing the impact of migration on a variety of specific 
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economic objectives, which, however, do not include an explicit social 
welfare per se.  Notably, migration is shown to influence the growth rate of 
the home economy, as in Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001), the average 
educational level, as highlighted by Stark et al. (1997, 1998) and Lien and 
Wang (2005), average productivity in Mountford (1997), as well as the wages 
of non-migrants in Stark (2004). 
Although there is now a burgeoning number of empirical studies, 
assessing different dimensions of the potential impact of brain drain and 
gain, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the size of conjectured 
positive effects of migration upon levels of education, welfare and/or growth.   
Notably, Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001, 2008) find that the 
proportion of migrants must be low for such effects to be apparent.  
According to Schiff (2006), preliminary studies by the World Bank show no 
positive impact, while Groizard and Llull (2006) indicate a similar finding. 
A recent critique by Rosenzweig (2006), which faults existing 
approaches to the analysis of brain drain and gain in two crucial respects, is 
particularly germane for motivating the modelling framework proposed in 
the current research.  First, he contends that the potential impact of the 
“‘risk’ of emigrating” for “domestically-educated tertiary educated 
person(s)” is de facto quite minimal.  Second, Rosenzweig goes on to suggest 
that “the literature ignores the endogeneity of the emigration probability”, 
while arguing that, in fact, “the choice of the location of tertiary education 
significantly affects the probability that the person can emigrate.”1 (p. 2-3)  
Critically, existing analytical research has paid relatively little attention to 
the question of whether distinctive brain drain and gain effects may arise, 
depending on the extent to which educational investments take place either 
in home and/or host countries.  Nonetheless, the policy stakes of the 
international mobility of high-skilled workers are increasingly recognized as 
a source of substantial policy concern.2
The research in the current paper proposes a two-country model, 
which offers a new theoretical paradigm for understanding the nexus 
between locational choices regarding human capital formation, international 
labour market conditions, and distinctive categories of brain drain and brain 
gain effects.  The analysis underscores an inherently wide-range of 
conceivable positive or negative effects on a home country’s net welfare.  
More specifically, distinctive elements of the proposed conceptual 
framework include the following: 
                                                 
1  While the analytical framework proposed by Rosenzweig does not allow for differences in individual abilities, 
his empirical findings are consistent with a number of the modeling assumptions which are subsequently invoked 
here.  Notably, he reports evidence that students are motivated by foreign studies in order to obtain employment in 
a host country and that quality differences in university systems also appear to trigger the decision to study abroad. 
2  See, for example, Leipziger (2008) and Solimano (2008). 
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1) Individuals, from a home country, choose whether to undertake 
studies abroad, which entail an incrementally higher sunk cost relative 
to studying at home.  While foreign studies are understood to generate 
greater improvements in labour-market productivity, as compared 
with levels achievable through domestic human capital formation, the 
realized extent of the gains depends on an individual student’s 
underlying abilities.  If subsequently offered foreign employment, 
students opt to stay abroad because of higher wages, thereby 
generating brain drain.  However, if individuals are unable to find 
suitable foreign employment, they still enjoy heightened productivity 
levels and wages, when returning home, as compared to not having 
studied abroad.  This generates brain gain.3
2) When modelling an individual’s choice of whether to study abroad or 
stay at home, a crucial variable is the probability of being hired in the 
foreign labour market. Contrarily to other models in which this 
probability is exogenous and identical for all graduates, it is assumed 
here to be a function of each individual’s expected level of qualification 
or, alternatively, productivity level, which, in turn, depends on ability. 
As a consequence, migrants are “favourably self selected” to use the 
terminology of Chiswick (1999). 
3) The criterion chosen to assess brain drain/brain gain effects is the net 
impact on the home national welfare.  This is represented, in a static 
framework, in terms of the change in domestic value-added resulting 
from  foreign studies and eventual migration,  This welfare calculation 
depends, in turn, on the associated consequences for the country’s level 
of productivity, as well as the additional costs of investment in 
education abroad.   It is assumed there are no remittances.4   
4) Since foreign studies enhance productivity and thereby potentially lead 
to beneficial welfare effects, public authorities in the home country 
may seek, under certain conditions, to encourage foreign studies by 
subsidizing the candidates through alternative grant schemes, subject 
to a given overall budgetary constraint.  Welfare implications of three 
conceivable grant policies are compared under alternative 
assumptions regarding the extent of a government’s knowledge of 
students’ underlying abilities.  Under a first, uniform subsidy scheme, 
grants are offered to an arbitrary subset of students, assuming that the 
government cannot observe underlying abilities.  The associated net 
                                                 
3 There are certain similarities between the proposed framework and the model of Kwok and Leland (1982), but 
their scenario does not include a brain gain effect. 
4 It is relatively straightforward to modify the proposed modeling framework, in order to allow for remittances, 
which would partially offset the negative welfare effects of brain drain.  While such an extension potentially 
impacts specific quantitative results, it does not modify the essential qualitative insights summarized in subsequent 
propositions. 
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welfare effects are then compared with those of two alternative 
schemes, merit and selective, which invoke the alternative assumption 
that the authorities can actually distinguish between students’ 
capabilities.  Whereas in the former case grants are only offered to the 
brightest students, in the latter scenario financing is restricted to a 
sub-set of students, corresponding to a particular talent-pool.
   The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 the basic 
modelling analysis starts with a sub-model of ex ante individual choice, 
regarding whether to undertake human capital formation at home or 
abroad.  An individual’s underlying ability determines known 
productivity gains from studying abroad, along with expected 
probabilities of subsequently obtaining foreign market employment at 
higher wages.  The evaluation of the ex post net impact of brain drain and 
brain gain depends on the size of the sub-populations of individuals who 
migrate permanently, as compared with those who return home with 
enhanced productivity, relative to wholly domestic trained workers.   
Section 3 presents some comparative static results, relating to the welfare 
effects of changing certain model parameters, which are essential for 
establishing subsequent propositions.  In Section 4 the relative welfare 
implications of alternative educational grant schemes, subsidizing studies 
abroad, are considered.  The analysis highlights a critical role for 
alternative assumptions regarding the extent of a public authority’s 
knowledge of underlying abilities, which are assumed known by the 
individuals themselves.  A concluding section briefly summarizes certain 
salient findings, while identifying a number of directions for further 
inquiry. 
Section II:  Basic Modelling Framework
II. A.  Sub-Model of Individual Investment in Human Capital Formation 
and International Migration 
 A two-country, two-period framework is postulated in order to focus 
on the implications of initial educational investment decisions, regarding 
where to undertake higher education, in light of anticipations regarding 
individuals’ subsequent employment prospects, at home or abroad.  In the 
first of two periods, individuals can choose to study in the domestic country, 
knowing that their job prospects will be confined to that market.  
Alternatively, they may elect to study abroad, albeit while incurring higher 
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sunk costs for their educational investments, but with known gains in 
productivity due to higher levels of educational attainment.  Although 
foreign studies enhance potential work prospects in both countries, 
individuals face uncertainty regarding whether they will be offered 
employment abroad.  
More specifically, out of an overall population of N individuals in the 
domestic country, N0 represents the number of domestic individuals who 
remain at home for both their education and work, while N* is the total 
number of persons who choose to undertake foreign studies and, 
subsequently, work either at home, or abroad.  Thus, there are two distinct 
sub-populations of N*, corresponding to the phenomena of “brain gain” and 
“brain drain”.  In particular, N1* designates the number of domestic 
individuals who chose to get educated abroad and subsequently work in the 
foreign country, while N1 corresponds to the number of domestic individuals 
who are educated abroad, but then return home to work.  In sum, whereas 
higher values of  N1* generate greater brain drain, increases in N1  results in 
more brain gain.  
The overall domestic population of N individuals are understood to 
differ in terms of their innate intellectual and work capacities, which for the 
kth individual, can be denoted as ck .  Whereas individuals know their own 
abilities, alternative hypotheses will be subsequently considered regarding 
the extent of the public authority’s information, about these capacities.  The 
attainable productivity levels for individuals depend not only on their 
underlying abilities, but also on educational investments, which enhance 
productivity to different degrees, depending on the quality of educational 
systems, at home, or abroad.  However, in the subsequent analysis, the 
quality of the domestic higher educational system, Q1 , is hypothesized to be 
inferior to that offered in the foreign country, Q2.  Hence, there is an 
educational production function that for a fixed period of investment in 
human capital in a particular educational system maps individuals’ 
capacities into their effective qualifications or productivity levels, ek , such 
that  ek=f(ck, Qj), where j=1,2.
5   This functional relation results in a range of 
attainable productivity levels, measured on a scale between, e0 and e2. For 
subsequent simplicity, a value of e0 is used as a numeraire to designate an 
unique level of productivity for all of the N0 domestically educated workers, 
regardless of their inherent capacities.  However, workers trained abroad, 
                                                 
5 More generally, the value of the kth individual’s human capital investments depends on the amount of time spent 
on education, the quality of university educational systems and his/her ability.  While the analysis here only 
provides for individuals undertaking higher educational studies in a single period and in only one country, it could 
be extended to allow for students spending different periods of time, either at home or abroad.  The returns from 
educational investments would then, depend on the specific stage of university, or earlier, studies, as well as 
country-specific differences in educational quality, which could be highly variable according to educational levels. 
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N1* or N1 , enjoy higher final productivity levels, which are uniformly 
distributed on an interval from e1 to e2 , according to their innate abilities. 
While offering the prospect of higher productivity gains, the decision 
to undertake foreign studies is understood to entail higher educational costs, 
I*, relative to the costs, I0 , borne by students who decide to pursue further 
education in the domestic country. Students will be willing to incur this 
difference between the foreign and domestic educational costs, designated as 
i = I* - I0 , provided such additional costs can be financed, prior to realizing 
expected higher returns arising from enhanced productivity gains.  
Accordingly, this analysis assumes perfect capital markets, since students 
can borrow against their expected future earnings, in order to finance the 
immediate sunk costs of educational investments.6  Subsequently, scenarios 
are considered where there are two distinct values for I*, depending on 
whether a student is granted a subsidy, S, by the domestic government.  The 
overall educational costs borne by subsidized and unsubsidized students are 
then designated, respectively, as I1* and I2*, where I1* = I2* - S, so that I1* < 
I2*.   In addition to deciding the amount of the educational grants per 
student, the domestic government determines the targeted number of 
students to be financed, in light of an overall budget constraint, F.  Note, 
then, that the propensity of individuals to undertake foreign studies is 
impacted by both quality and cost differentials.  Of course, national 
educational pricing policies, corresponding to the variables I* and I0 , reflect 
overall educational budgets and subsidies, as well as the openness of 
educational systems and their capacity to attract international students.7
Individuals’ ex ante willingness to incur sunk costs of educational 
investments is clearly impacted by anticipations regarding the labour market 
conditions they face after graduating - both at home and abroad.  The latter 
                                                 
6  The question of how liquidity constraints arising from the impossibility of borrowing in order to finance 
expected increased income resulting from human capital formation is raised by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 
(2008).  In their macroeconomic framework, a representative individual self-finances his/her studies in an initial 
period, while facing exogenously specified probabilities of subsequently earning higher pay abroad through 
emigration. Unlike the analysis proposed here Beine et al (2008) do not consider the implications of different 
government schemes for financing human capital formation, either at home, or abroad, in order to compensate for 
inter-temporal capital market imperfections.  Clearly, the potential importance of individual and family liquidity 
constraints depends on social and income inequality in a given country, the standard of living, as well as 
educational pricing policies.  It should also be noted that the possibility of personal bankruptcy linked to 
divergences between ex ante and ex post wage expectations is precluded from the current analysis.  
7 Game-theoretic questions, relating to the international welfare implications of fellowships being financed by, 
alternatively, the domestic or foreign country are not examined in this paper.  Of course, university fees, while 
constituting only one component of the overall costs facing international students, may only partially be reflecting 
the overall costs and quality of foreign educational systems.  Fees for international students determine the relative 
ease of access to national educational systems from abroad and, thereby, reflect countries’ international 
educational and foreign policies.   Yet, there is also a potential interdependency between the share of a university 
system’s costs borne by national students, and fees required for international students, since they impact together 
the overall financing of a host country’s university system.  Furthermore, a more in-depth modeling framework 
could also consider how the structure of quality-adjusted, national pricing policies at different educational levels 
impacts individuals’ overall life-time investments in human capital formation.  Clearly, there are associated 
indirect effects on decisions to undertake further studies abroad.     
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are reflected not only by hiring prospects, but also by both the absolute and 
relative returns from working in each country.  In the proposed framework, 
once individuals have been educated abroad, they are assumed to have the ex 
post option of seeking employment abroad, at a higher wage, w*, than in 
their home market.  For the overall population of N* workers, who are 
educated abroad, each individual, k, faces a probability, pk , of finding 
qualified employment abroad.  This probability plays a crucial role in the 
analysis, as it delineates “brain drain” from “brain gain” effects. This is 
readily apparent by comparing two extreme scenarios, where, as an initial 
simplification, the probability values are identical for all individuals: 
a) In the first instance, all individuals from the domestic country, even if 
they are educated abroad, face a zero probability of being employed 
abroad. Consequently, all individuals undertaking studies abroad will  
be motivated, ex ante, by a comparison of the differential gain in wages 
at home, arising from foreign, instead of domestic, training, in relation 
to the incremental investment cost of foreign studies.  This case 
corresponds to a pure brain gain effect.  Students benefit from 
enhanced productivity levels procured from a higher quality foreign 
education, but, nonetheless, always return home to work. 
b) A polar scenario applies when all foreign-educated individuals from 
the home country are sure to get a better paying job abroad, 
regardless of their attained productivities, so pk=1 for all k.  Provided 
the incremental income gain, which in this case arises from migration, 
fully offsets the additional cost of foreign studies, all individuals will 
undertake foreign studies and none will return home. Hence, this 
corresponds to a case of pure brain drain.  In the proposed analysis, 
the increase in earnings is greater than in the previous case since, for 
the same level of qualification, foreign remuneration is assumed to be 
greater than in the home labour market. 
Now, a more intermediate value of pk, comprised between 0 and 1, will be 
considered, under a restrictive assumption that the probability of finding a 
foreign job is identical for all individuals.  Then again, for appropriate wage 
and educational cost parameters, all individuals will leave if pk is sufficiently 
high.  Yet, only a fraction, 1 – pk , will return to work in the domestic labour 
market. Consequently, both brain drain and brain gain will arise, 
respectively, in the proportions pk and 1 – pk.   
Nonetheless, in the proposed model, the probability of finding 
employment abroad varies across individuals, since it depends on their 
expected levels of productivity, which, in turn, are related to underlying 
abilities and educational choices.  The values of pk are assumed to be 
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uniformly distributed across the population, so that a more complex mix of 
brain drain and brain gain effects needs to be examined.  More specifically, 
each of the pk values is taken to depend linearly on the level of the effective 
qualifications realized by the kth individual, ek , relative to a threshold value, 
E1 , reflecting a minimum standard in the foreign labour market, and 
negatively on the range of skill requirements, E2 -  E1, such that: 
   (1.)  
)E(E
)E(e
)p(ep
12
1k
kk  
 
!!
Figure 1 offers a representative illustration of the assumed distribution 
of effective qualification levels for domestic individuals, in relation to the 
skill requirements of the foreign labour market.  Intermediate values for the 
parameters E1 and E2 are assumed, where these threshold values, 
respectively, preclude or guarantee foreign market employment.  Thus, in 
the proposed model, each foreign-trained, domestic-origin, student faces a 
non-zero probability of finding employment abroad.  As a simplification, it 
will be assumed that individuals, who chose to remain at home for their 
education, are unable to work abroad.8
             Figure 1
         The Assumed Structure of Skill Levels Attainable at Home or Abroad,
        Relative to Foreign Labour Market Requirements
 
 
      e0        E1       e1         e2       E2
The parameters, E1 and E2, can be understood to reflect foreign labour 
market conditions and policies, where employment standards abroad are 
influenced by the overall quality of the foreign educational system 
(including, for example, pre-university studies), as well as by technology-
driven, labour-demand requirements.  Different combinations of these 
parameter values can also be interpreted to represent alternative 
immigration policies, restricting labour market access depending on the skill 
intensities of available jobs in the foreign country.  For instance, lower 
values of E2 could, ceteris paribus, represent a situation of relative shortages 
for specific categories of highly skilled workers.  Furthermore, lower 
                                                 
8
  Eventual rationale for this assumption include an inadequate relative quality, or high-degree of specificity, of 
the domestic educational system, positive social network effects on employment arising from foreign studies, 
and/or restrictive immigration policies, favouring students trained abroad. 
 10
(higher) values of both of these foreign market parameters can be 
interpreted as corresponding to alternative foreign immigration policies, 
facilitating (hindering) the immigration of foreign skilled workers. 
 Following their studies, foreign-trained domestic students have an 
incentive to seek employment abroad due to the higher foreign salaries, w*, 
for skilled jobs.  In their home country returning students can only earn a 
lower reservation wage, w1 .
9  For tractability, both of these salaries are 
assumed to be unique values, independent of the students’ effective 
qualification levels achieved though studies abroad.  Furthermore, it is 
assumed that this reservation wage is higher than both the remuneration 
offered to wholly domestically trained workers, w0 , and the foreign wage, 
which they can earn in less skilled jobs abroad, w0*.  Consequently, if 
students are unsuccessful in finding appropriate skilled work in the foreign 
country, they will return home.10  Finally, although the wage rates are taken 
to be exogenous, the subsequent analysis will consider comparative static 
changes in their values, reflecting the relative attractiveness of labour 
market conditions internationally.  Figure 2 summarizes the overall 
international structure of wages, depending on job locations and educational 
backgrounds   
        Figure 2
 The Structure of International Wages According to Job Location
         and Educational Background
                w0      w0*     w1           w* 
 The ex ante optimization problem for the representative kth student 
involves a trade-off, corresponding to an arbitrage condition.  The net 
returns from studying and working at home, with lower overall effective 
qualifications, need to be compared to expected higher wage earnings, 
arising from enhanced productivity due to foreign studies, albeit at a greater 
investment cost.  The expected wage remuneration involves a probability 
weighted average of wages for more skilled workers in the foreign and 
                                                 
9  An exchange rate of unity is assumed. 
10  Of course, other factors, such as personal and family considerations could offset the locational incentives of 
these ex post wage differentials between the two countries.  Such additional factors can be modeled in terms of 
complementary or substitutable, agent-specific assets and associated sunk costs.  It can be noted that, ceteris 
paribus, if students have a preference to return home, there will be an increase in brain gain effects, relative to 
those identified in the subsequent analysis. 
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domestic markets.  Accordingly, a representative student will decide to study 
in the foreign country if: 
  (2.)  001kk I wI*)wp(1*wp  "  #
Hence, the kth individual will decide to study abroad if his/her individual 
probability of being hired abroad, pk is higher than a critical probability 
value, p .  This probability is assumed to depend on a student’s, potentially 
private, information regarding his/her future productivity level, ek .  More 
specifically, the interrelation between this critical probability value, p , and 
the prevailing international wage rates and educational costs are given by:
  (3.)  
1
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-w*w
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1
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                            p  = 0              if  
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From (1.), it follows that the productivity level corresponding to p  is:                   
112
Ep)E(Ee~ # !   However, e~ does not necessarily belong to the segment of 
productivity levels attainable from foreign studies, [e1 , e2 ], so that the actual 
productivity threshold is e  such that 
(4.)           e  = 
112
Ep)E(Ee~ # !     if $e~ [e1 , e2 ], 
                            e  = e1         if e~   <  e1,
                  e  = e2         if e~  > e2.
As a consequence, out of the overall population of domestic individuals, the 
proportion of students staying at home is given by  
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N  , while the 
residual proportion pursuing studies abroad is the complementary value, 
equaling
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II. B.  Production and Welfare in the Home Country
Production, or value-added at home is taken to be characterized by a linear 
function, reflecting a proportional relation to productivity. Thus, if 
individuals were not able to study abroad, national output would be Y0 = e0
N, which constitutes an essential benchmark involving only domestically 
trained workers.  Since productivity is taken to be uniformly distributed, the 
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overall increase in productivity, de, resulting from an arbitrary marginal 
proportion, dn, of the total domestic population, N, being trained abroad, is 
such that 
12 ee
de
N
dn
 
!  .  However, only the fraction (1-p(e)) of this population, 
not finding better paying foreign employment, will return to work at home.  
Hence, the total number of foreign-educated individuals returning home is 
specified by N1 = % &dep(e)1ee
N
2e
e12
'   .  The contribution to national production 
generated by these returning individuals corresponds, then, to Y1 =
% &dnp(e)1e
N
N0
'   = % &dep(e)1eee
N
2e
e12
'   , which constitutes the  incremental increase 
in national income resulting from brain gain.  Analogously, the number of 
foreign-educated individuals staying abroad is N1* = dep(e)ee
N
2e
e12
'  .  As a 
reminder, then, the number of individual who both study and work at home 
can be expressed as N0 = N - (N1 + N1*) = 
12
1
ee
eeN
 
 .  From the foregoing 
expressions, it can be readily seen that 
a) N0 is increasing with the threshold productivity level, e , whereas N1
and N1* are both decreasing. 
b) N1 and N1* increase as the lower limit of productivity attainable from 
a foreign education, e1 rises, for a given e2.  Both of these populations also 
increase when both the limits, e1 and e2 , rise, for a given range of enhanced 
productivity levels, e2-e1 , arising from foreign training.  The number of 
students staying abroad, N1*, is also increasing with e2 , for given e1 .  In 
contrast, the number of foreign-trained returning students, N1 has a 
maximum for some value of e2.  Beyond this limiting value, an improvement 
in the highest productivity level, attainable by the best foreign-trained 
domestic students, will accentuate the extent of brain drain. 
A distinctive feature of the proposed analysis is the explicit 
consideration of how brain drain and brain gain effects, linked to 
international human capital formation, impact social welfare.  As previously 
noted, an essential benchmark value is Y0, which corresponds to a scenario 
where there is neither brain gain, nor brain drain.  In the context of the 
subsequent social welfare calculations, e0 can be viewed as the individual 
return in terms of the attainable level of productivity, given past and future 
social investment costs associated with an individual’s education in the 
domestic country.  Once international human capital formation is allowed 
for, the net variation of welfare, resulting from individuals studying abroad, 
is understood to equal the change in value-added, linked to brain gain minus 
the opportunity cost of losing workers abroad, or brain drain, and 
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subtracting the supplementary investment cost of undertaking foreign 
education.11  More formally, this change in social welfare is given by: 
()*+ ,W = Y1 - e0  (N - N0) – i ( N-N0 ) = Y1 – C( N-N0 ).
-
Note that the expression, C = e0 + i , reflects the maximal, social opportunity 
cost arising from an individual studying abroad, if there is no compensatory 
brain gain.  This expression corresponds to the associated loss of national 
production and the higher net educational investment cost of foreign studies, 
relative to the benchmark autarkic case.  More explicitly, the overall change 
in domestic welfare equals: 
(.*+--,W = % & dei)(ep(e)1e
ee
N
2
0
12
' #   
e
e
In light of expression (1.), this is equivalent to: 
(/*+--,W = % &dei)(e
E-E
e-Ee
ee
N
2
0
12
2
12
' #  
e
e
 = ' 
2
12 ee
N
e
e
0 (e) de = 
12
2
ee
)e () (e
N
 
 -
where the integrand is 0(e) = i)(e
E-E
e-Ee 0
12
2 # , and 1 is the primitive function 
of 0: 
1(e) = - i)e(e-  
)E2(E
e E
)E3(E
e
0
12
2
2
12
3
#
 
#
 
 
As shown by equation (7.), the incremental change in domestic welfare 
is a function of all the parameters of the model.  To summarize, it depends 
on: 
_ e0 :  the productivity of less-skilled domestically-trained workers; 
_ e1 and e2 :  the two extreme values defining the range of enhanced 
productivity levels for foreign-educated workers; 
_ E1 and E2 : parameters reflecting foreign market skill requirements
and labour market access conditions, which impact the probability of 
finding work abroad; 
_ e  , the threshold value of productivity, which decides whether an 
individual chooses to study abroad, which, in turn, is impacted by  
among other factors, the wages of skilled workers employed abroad, 
                                                 
11  The educational costs for society of training students, prior to their deciding to study abroad and, subsequently, 
working permanently there, could also, arguably, be considered to negatively impact domestic social welfare.  
There would then be an additional term, negatively impacting domestic welfare, as a result of brain drain.  On the 
other hand, the proposed specification of the social welfare function does not allow for the positive impact of 
remittances, which would depend on the value of w*, along with different propensities characterizing individuals’ 
decisions to transfer funds back home. 
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w*, skilled workers employed at home, w1 , and unskilled workers at 
home, w0 ;
12
_ i :  the cost differential between studying abroad and at 
 home. 
The expression for the primitive function in equation (7.), 1-2 which 
critically defines the extent of the change in domestic welfare, is of the third 
degree in e.  The underlying reason for such a functional form is the second 
degree form for the integrand, 0(e), in equation (7.), which represents the 
expected increase in net welfare for a representative individual.  This 
expression involves a trade-off between the expected increase in productivity 
realized through brain gain, e(1-p(e)) – e0 , and the incremental cost of a 
foreign education, i.   Since the former quadratic term in e assumes low 
values for either relatively low or high productivity values, the values of the 
integrand are initially negative, then positive (for sufficiently low i) and 
finally negative, as representative productivity levels for different individuals 
increase.   
As illustrated in Figure 3, the general form of the primitive function 1
may first show a minimum, for e = 1eˆ , and then a maximum for e = 2eˆ .
Noting, again, that the social cost of a foreign education is denoted by C = e0
+ i, the values of  1eˆ  and 2eˆ  are given, respectively, by 
% &)CE4(EEE
2
1
eˆ
12
2
221
   !   and % &)CE4(EEE
2
1
eˆ
12
2
222
  #! .  Of 
course, these extrema exist if and only if 0)CE4(EE
12
2
2
"  , which leads to: 
(8.)     
)E4(E
E
C
12
2
2
 
3 .
If the social cost of a foreign education, C, is too high, 1 is always decreasing 
with e, and as a consequence, the change in domestic welfare, -,W, is always 
negative, so that the brain drain effect dominates that of brain gain.   The 
value for which 1 has a minimum, 1eˆ  , is relevant only if the latter is greater 
than E1.  Calculations show that the associated condition is simply:  
(9.)  E1 < C . 
In the rest of the paper, it is assumed that conditions (8.) and (9.) are always 
satisfied. 
                                                 
12 As shown by considering equations 3 and 4. 
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                   Figure 3
                   Representation of the Functional Form for-12--which Determines
     the Overall Change in Domestic Welfare
 
 
Section III:   An Analysis of the Effects on Economic Welfare of Changes in 
Key Model Parameters 
III.1 The Interrelation between Threshold Productivity Levels and Changes 
in Welfare
The initial focus here is on the welfare implications of the critical value 
of e , which reflects the threshold productivity level for which a 
representative individual chooses to study abroad.  The value of e  in 
relation to 2eˆ  is potentially of key importance.  Note again that e  is a 
function of the critical threshold probability, p , triggering foreign study, as 
well as of the foreign labour market productivity requirements, E1 and E2;
while 2eˆ  is a function of E1, E2 , and the social opportunity cost of foreign 
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studies, C,  where:  
112
Ep)E(Ee # !  and % &)CE4(EEE
2
1
eˆ
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  #!  .  
Hence, it follows that e > 2eˆ  for p  > plim , where plim = 
12
112
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12
EE
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 .  The value of plim is always inferior to one, 
and while it could be negative, this would mean that E1 > ê2 .  However, this 
corresponds to a relatively uninteresting case, where domestic welfare 
always declines, as a result of individuals studying abroad.  For more 
relevant scenarios, there is an actual probability threshold beyond which e >
2eˆ .  It can also easily be seen that when e  increases and e2 > ê1 , ,W has a 
maximum for e  = ê1 .  Thus, if initially e  < ê1 , a marginal increase in e
promotes welfare.  However, if e  > ê1 , an increase in e  reduces the number 
of people who study abroad, thereby reducing welfare.  An examination of 
Figure 3 and a comparison of the values taken by the function 1 for e and e2,
leads then to the following: 
Proposition 1
For intermediate values of the threshold productivity value, e ,
determining whether individuals will study abroad, and of the upper limit on 
the associated level of enhanced productivity, e2 , specifically belonging to the 
interval [ 1eˆ , 2eˆ ], the change in welfare resulting from studying abroad, ,W, is 
positive.  Hence, the welfare improvement from brain gain dominates the loss 
due to brain drain. 
In contrast, there are three cases where foreign studies generate a loss of 
welfare.  Notably, 
a) when e and e2  are both very low, the return to foreign education, in 
terms of increased productivity, is weak and does not compensate for its 
social costs, even if many individuals study abroad and return home to 
work, e ; 
b) when e and e2 are both very high, few individuals leave to study abroad, 
but most of these will readily find a job abroad, resulting in a dominance 
of the brain drain effect; 
c) when e is low and e2 is high, there is an accumulation of the foregoing 
      effects a) and b).  Notably, many individuals study abroad, thereby  
      generating high additional educational investment costs, but 
      only those with lower-productivity gains return home.      
In sum, the welfare implications of comparative static changes in 
productivity levels, e  and e2 , are inherently ambiguous. 
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III.2  The Configuration of Wages and Associated Welfare Effects
The influence of wages on domestic welfare works through changes in 
the critical values for p  and e .  As can be expected, higher wages for 
domestically trained workers create, ceteris paribus, a disincentive to 
studying abroad, so when w0 increases, both p  and e  increase.  However, 
when the potential job market returns to foreign studies w* or w1 increase, 
the incentives to studying abroad are increased, so that p  and e  are 
lowered.  The associated consequences for domestic welfare stem from the 
preceding analysis of the influence of e .  Specifically, if e  is not very low 
(inferior to ê1), an increase (decrease) in wages for foreign-trained (domestic-
trained) workers, decreases e , thereby enhancing welfare. 
 
III.3  Welfare Implications of Changes in the Relative Productivity Gains 
from Education at Home and Abroad
It is also straightforward to see that a heightened efficiency for 
domestically-trained workers, e0, by increasing the opportunity cost of 
undertaking foreign studies, generates a negative influence on the net impact 
on welfare of brain drain and brain gain.  In contrast, an increase in the 
lower limit of the enhanced efficiency level attained via foreign studies, e1 , 
raises the returns to a foreign education, and induces a larger proportion of 
the population to study abroad.  The effect of a variation in e2 is more 
complex to assess.  By widening the span of productivity values, an increase 
of e2 , ceteris paribus, has a negative influence upon ,W.  If e2 > ê2 , 1(e2)
also decreases, so that the overall effect is also negative.  However, if e2
belongs to the interval [ê1 , ê2] , 1(e2) increases and the net effect is 
indeterminate.  More specifically, the formula for the derivative of ,W is: 
(10.)  
2de
Wd, = 
2
12
)e(e
N
 
{1( e ) –[1(e2) – (e2 –e1 )-0(e2)]} . 
It can be seen that, if e  < ê2 , so that ,W may be positive, then the foregoing 
expression is negative for e2 =  ê2 .  Consequently, the change in the domestic 
country’s welfare has a maximum for some value of e2   (also inferior to ê2).  
In light of the foregoing analysis, the following holds: 
Proposition 2
The change in the domestic country’s welfare, ,W, is an increasing 
function of the level of e2 , the maximal level of enhanced productivity 
achievable by undertaking studies abroad, provided e2 remains under a critical 
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level.  Beyond this threshold, ,W decreases with e2 .  Thus, too much of an 
improvement in human capital, or, alternatively, relative excellence in the 
foreign institutions, generates a dominant brain drain.  
The associated critical value of e2 is increasing with the threshold 
productivity level determining whether students go abroad, e , and decreasing 
with the lower limit of the value of enhanced productivity, e1 . 
Finally, if both e1 and e2 increase with a constant span between the two 
values, ,W has a maximum for e2 = ê2 .  In that case, from the perspective of 
domestic welfare, there is also an optimal level of relative efficiency in the 
foreign educative system.  Any increase of efficiency above this level will 
diminish home national welfare. 
III.4  Changes in the Sunk Cost Differential for Studying Abroad
As the additional sunk costs associated with foreign studies, i , 
increase, the integrand function 0 decreases.  There is a resulting loss of 
welfare (provided only values of e for which 0 is positive are considered).  
Furthermore, the threshold probability of finding a job abroad increases, as 
does the corresponding threshold productivity level, e .  As a consequence, so 
long as $ e  [ê1 , ê2], an increase in the incremental costs of studies abroad, i,  
reduces the home country’s welfare.  In contrast, for low values of e ( e < ê1), 
an increase in i could possibly be beneficial.  In such a scenario there is an 
excessive flight of students abroad, since, for a representative student, the 
productivity gains from a foreign education are high, whereas the additional 
costs, i, are low.   
III.5  Alternative Immigrant Employment Policies in the Foreign Country
The relative ease of access to the foreign labour market is captured 
here by alternative values for the labour market requirement parameters, E1
and E2.  Ceteris paribus, for higher values of either parameter it is more 
difficult for a domestic-origin, but foreign-trained, job-searcher with a given 
qualification level to be employed abroad.  More specifically, when either E1,
or E2 increase, e  increases, but p(ek) decreases for any value of ek .  
Crucially, there are two offsetting effects.  On the one hand, fewer 
individuals leave to become educated abroad, but, on the other hand, a 
greater fraction of graduated students come back home.  Thus, the total pool 
of foreign trained students from the domestic country is reduced.  This 
means that the overall exposure of the domestic country to welfare changes, 
arising from either brain drain or brain gain, decreases.  However, the 
relative proportion of foreign-trained students generating a brain gain 
 19
increases as a result of the more restrictive job filtering environment in the 
foreign country.  Consequently, the net effect on domestic welfare is 
potentially ambiguous.  
 As demonstrated in Appendix 1, the following summary conclusion 
applies:
Proposition 3
Restrictions limiting entry by foreign-trained students to the host 
country’s labour market increase home national welfare, provided the 
following conditions hold: 
a.  the cost differential for undertaking foreign studies is high;  
b.  the maximum achievable productivity level, e2, is relatively low; and  
c.  relatively few individuals undertake studies abroad  
     (i.e. p is near 1).   
In contrast, if the foregoing conditions are not satisfied, then less favourable 
foreign labour market conditions result in a negative impact on domestic 
welfare. 
Section IV:  A Comparative Analysis of the Domestic Welfare Implications 
of Alternative Educational Grant Schemes
The focus in this section is on the optimal policy design, for a home 
country, of educational grants, aimed at facilitating foreign study for specific 
categories of students.  Since alternative subsidy programs change the 
incentives to study abroad, they potentially impact the balance between 
brain drain and brain gain, which, in turn, determines the net changes in 
domestic welfare.  Three different grant schemes will be considered, which 
invoke alternative assumptions regarding the extent of a government’s 
knowledge of students’ underlying abilities.  Under a first grant program, 
labelled as an uniform scheme, the public authorities have no information 
regarding differences in students’ underlying abilities when assessing their 
expected future productivity gains achievable from foreign studies.  Notably, 
such uniform grants, amounting to a value of S for each potential 
beneficiary, are proposed for a proportion 4 of individuals in the overall 
population, N.  These awards, then, are independent of the inherent abilities 
of a specific grantee and, consequently, his/her expected gains in 
productivity.  While such a program reduces the potential cost of individuals 
undertaking foreign studies, there are, of course, potential welfare 
inefficiencies, since certain grant recipients would have opted anyway to 
study abroad, even in the absence of such a program. 
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In contrast, under an alternative paradigm, where the government can 
discriminate ex ante between students according to their abilities, two 
different merit grant schemes will be considered.  Under the first scheme, 
grants are only proposed to the most qualified individuals, who would not 
otherwise be able to undertake foreign studies.  More specifically, such 
grants will be awarded to students, whose productivity is inferior to the 
critical level e , but superior to a limit fixed by budgetary constraints.  Here, 
again, e   corresponds to the productivity threshold for which students are 
prepared to go abroad even in the absence of an educational award.  Note 
that in this first case of an unrestricted merit grant scheme the targeted 
individuals constitute a sub-population of relatively more capable students, 
who have particularly good employment prospects abroad, so that there is a 
relatively high ex ante probability of brain drain.  Hence, it is conceivably 
more efficient for a government to offer a second, alternative scheme of 
merit grants restricted to somewhat less capable individuals, since a larger 
proportion of those students would actually return home to work, thereby 
generating greater brain gain.
IV.1  Uniform Grants
Under this grant scheme a lump-sum amount, S, is proposed to a 
fraction 4 of the overall population of N individuals, without any a priori 
knowledge regarding their underlying abilities.  While only certain of these 
grant recipients will actually decide to study abroad, that sub-population 
potentially includes individuals who would have chosen to go abroad without 
a grant, since unlike the public authorities, individuals know their own 
abilities.  Thus, there is an inherent potential inefficiency in such a uniform 
grant program, arising from the asymmetry of information between the 
grantee and recipients.  For grant beneficiaries, the incremental cost of 
foreign education will now be denoted by i1 = I1* - I0.  However, the 
incremental cost for unsubsidized students remains i = I2* - I0 , where I2*
now denotes the full-cost of foreign studies, so that i – i1 = I2* – I1* = S.  
Clearly, then the threshold probability of studying abroad differs for the two 
sub-populations.  Specifically, for grant recipients, that value is given by 
1
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b
-w*w
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 p ! , which corresponds to a productivity threshold 
b
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productivities, the interval 
b
ee   corresponds to the sub-class of grant 
recipients who would otherwise have stayed home without such financing, 
but actually decide to go abroad.  Of course, individuals with expected 
productivity levels inferior to 
b
e will still stay at home, whereas those with 
productivity levels superior to e would have studied abroad anyway.  For 
the latter individuals, such uniform grants are just a redistributive transfer 
from the state, without any net impact on welfare. 13 14
Essential dimensions, characterizing the overall uniform grant  policy 
initiative, include the value, S,  proposed for each identified grant recipient 
and the proportion, 42 of the overall population, N individuals, being 
targeted.  Together these influence the number of potential beneficiaries 
actually going abroad, N*, in light of the overall government budgetary 
constraint limiting the total expenses on this program, Fb.  Clearly, a key 
issue here is that certain targeted grant recipients may actually decide not to 
study abroad.  Hence, there is an interdependency between 42 S, and Fb due 
to the government’s incomplete information regarding the underlying 
abilities of proposed grant recipients. The expression for overall government 
expenditures, for such a uniform grant program, is given by: 
(11.)  Fb = 45%( b2 ee  )/ (e2 – e1][( bee  )(w* - w1)/(E2 – E1)] =  
                           k 4(
b2
ee  )(
b
ee  ) , 
Here, k designates a constant term equal to [N/ (e2 – e1][(w* - w1)/(E2 –E1).   
With such a uniform grant scheme, the overall variation of social 
welfare, resulting from individuals studying abroad, comprises two effects 
and is given by: 
(12.)  ,Wb = 4 ' 
e
eb12
ee
N
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e
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The first term of this expression is the incremental change in welfare 
generated by the uniform grant program per se, whereas the second term is 
the welfare effect resulting from foreign studies, in the absence of any such 
grant initiative.  As a consequence, the net impact of uniform grants is 
                                                 
13 This analysis abstracts from issues regarding the opportunity cost of the public expenditures used to subsidize 
foreign studies, relative to the private use of such funds. 
14  If the framework of the analysis were expanded to allow for a distinction between rich and poor individuals, an 
alternative policy option could be for a government to propose “uniform” loans for sub-populations of less 
financially-privileged individuals, who are not able to afford foreign studies.  Clearly, if such educational loans are 
associated with the obligation to return home to work, they will only generate brain gain effects.  At the same 
time, such a measure counters the potential informational asymmetry a government faces with respect to its 
capacity to identify students’ underlying abilities, since there would be an  underlying self-selection mechanism 
for financially constrained individuals, which implicitly reveals their abilities. 
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welfare increasing if and only if the values for the primitive function are 
such that 1( e ) > 1(
b
e ).  The optimal grant policy maximizes ,Wb by 
choosing values of 4 and S, for a given foreign educational budget, Fb.
These, in turn, endogenously determine the new threshold efficiency level, 
b
e
, at which individuals decide to study abroad.  The analysis in Appendix 2 
characterizes the effects of varying the levels of 
b
e  on the net changes in 
economic welfare, ,Wb , which leads to the following: 
Proposition 4
Let us consider a scenario where a government is awarding uniform 
grants for foreign studies, under conditions where it has no information 
regarding students’ innate abilities and it faces a specific educational budget 
constraint.  Then, the optimal proportion of the population, 42 which should 
receive such awards, depends on the value of e , reflecting the threshold 
productivity level for which individuals will chose to study abroad in the 
absence of foreign educational subsidies. 
More specifically, for 
221
eˆeeeˆ 333  , ,Wb is an increasing function of 
a new threshold value 
b
e  , determined by the uniform grant program, and, 
as a consequence, also a function of 4.  It is then optimum to choose 4 = 1, 
that is to propose a grant to all individuals in the overall population.  For 
22
eˆe "   and e far enough from e2 , the same result applies.  However, for 
22
eˆe "  and e near to  e2 , there is an optimal value for be , where only a sub-
population is targeted as grant recipients, such that 4 is inferior to 1, 
provided that the budget constraint, Fb , is small enough (since for given be ,
4 is an increasing function of Fb ).  Furthermore, it can be observed that in 
the case where 
22
eˆe "  and e is such that 1( e ) > 1(e2), the change of 
welfare, ,W, would be negative in the absence of grants.  In sum, the 
rationale for the introduction of uniform grants, in this final case, is that 
they can generate an increase in welfare, provided available funds are large 
enough to set 
b
e  at a value sufficiently low to satisfy the condition  1(
b
e ) <  
1(e2). 
IV.2  Merit Grants
In this alternative scenario, unlike in the previous case of uniform 
grants, the government is assumed to be omniscient, having full information 
regarding the underlying ability of all students.  Accordingly, grants will be 
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allocated as a function of a candidate’s ability, or, equivalently, in light of the 
expected gain in an individual’s productivity.  However, unlike the previous 
scenario for uniform grants, individuals whose productivity is superior to the 
standard threshold e will never be grant beneficiaries, since there is no need 
for any additional financial incentive to undertake foreign studies.  Thus, an 
inherent informational inefficiency of the uniform grant scheme is avoided.  
Under a merit system, all individuals, whose productivity levels are 
comprised between a designated level, 
m
e  and e , will now receive a grant.  
The lower productivity limit for the grant recipients, 
m
e  , is, as with uniform 
grants, endogenously determined by the per capita value of the foreign 
educational subsidies and the government’s overall educational budget 
constraint. 
If
m
p indicates the threshold probability for beneficiaries of a merit 
grant to study abroad, then, there is a standard  interrelation between that 
value and the associated threshold productivity level, 
m
e  , such that: 
m
e =(E2
– E1) mp  + E1 .  It follows that the interval of productivity levels 
characterizing merit grant recipients, e -
m
e  , is proportional to p -
m
p , and, 
consequently, to the level of the grant S.  Since the range of beneficiaries is 
proportional to e -
m
e , a given grant budget can be expressed as: 
(13.)  Fm = k ( e - me )
2,
where k is the same constant term as in equation 11.  Hence, for a particular 
value of the individual subsidy, S, this budget determines directly the 
threshold 
m
e .
The overall change in welfare, induced by such a merit grant scheme, 
again, results from two effects and is specified by: 
(14.)  ,Wm =
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As in the previous welfare analysis for uniform grants, the first term 
captures the incremental impact on welfare of the specific grant program, 
while the second relates to the overall enhancing impact of foreign human 
capital formation, as compared to the autarkic benchmark case.  A merit 
grant program will have a positive effect on welfare if 1(
m
e ) < 1( e ).  
However,   when e > ê2, and the overall funds for foreign studies grants are 
relatively limited, it is possible  that 
m
e > ê2 , so that the merit grant program 
actually has the perverse effect of worsening the loss of welfare, relative to a 
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situation without any such grants.  Thus, in order to be efficient, merit 
grants must be sufficiently large, so that the threshold level 
m
e  becomes 
small enough to satisfy 1(
m
e ) <  1(e2).  Yet, grant schemes for which me  < 1eˆ
are not efficient, since there is a welfare maximum for  
m
e  = 
1
eˆ  .  Of course, 
the feasibility of implementing specific grant policies depends on there being 
a large enough budget, Fm , as well as the value of e1 . 
The welfare effects of uniform and merit grants can now be compared 
on the basis of equations (11.) through (14.), which specify the expressions 
for the incremental welfare changes and the corresponding budgetary 
constraint under these alternative programs.  First. it can be noted that 
identical welfare changes can be realized under the two schemes, such that 
,Wb =  ,Wm , by targeting the same threshold productivity, be = me .  Notably, 
this occurs when uniform grants are offered for the entire population, 4 = 1.  
However, the overall financial cost for such an uniform grant program is 
inherently higher, since (
b2
ee  ) (
b
ee  ) > ( e -
b
e )2.  This inefficiency 
reflects the asymmetric information the government faces in the case of 
uniform grants. 
A more general comparative analysis of the welfare effects of the two 
programs needs to consider the conditions under which uniform grants can 
generate a greater increase in welfare, than with merit grants, ,Wb >  ,Wm ,
subject to identical budgetary requirements, Fb = Fm =F.  The analysis of 
the comparison between ,Wb and ,Wm is developed in Appendix 3 and leads 
to the following conclusion: 
Proposition 5
In comparison to uniform grants, where a government lacks any 
information regarding students’ abilities, a system of merit grants, which 
presupposes full knowledge of abilities, is inherently superior, provided that e
< ê2 .  This sufficient inequality condition stipulates that the productivity level, 
reflecting the threshold for which individuals will chose to study abroad in the 
absence of foreign educational subsidies, must be less than a specific critical 
value. 
 Finally, if e > ê2 , there are some situations for which uniform grants are 
actually more efficient than merit grants.  These are typically associated with a 
combination of low (but not excessively so) values for the overall budget and 
high values of the productivity threshold. 
IV.3  Selective Grant Policies Targeting a Specific Subset of Students
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A problem with the foregoing merit grant program is that there is an 
apparent risk that educational subsidies offered to only the brightest 
students will foster excessive brain drain, relative to brain gain, given their 
relatively stronger employment prospects  in higher-wage foreign labour 
markets.  Hence, it is conceivable that grants which target somewhat less-
qualified students may promote greater brain gain effects, since such 
students are more likely to return home to work.  The analysis here 
considers a selective grant policy, targeting specific categories of students, 
assuming that the government knows, ex ante, students’ abilities, as in the 
case of merit grants.  However, unlike the latter scenario the student 
beneficiaries are now not necessarily among the most capable students, who 
are prevented from going abroad by a lack of funding.  The welfare effects of 
such an optimally designed program will be compared with those arising 
from a merit grant scheme.  Under this restricted merit scheme it is 
postulated that the grants are aimed at a sub-population of individuals 
having a hypothetical maximum productivity level equal to 6; where, of 
course, 6 < e , in order to ensure that there is a sufficiently high level of 
brain gain.  For a specific value of the foreign educational subsidy, there is 
potentially a subset of students, relative to the targeted group, with relatively 
lower abilities for whom the privately anticipated probability of finding 
employment abroad may not be large enough to warrant incurring the 
additional costs of foreign studies.  Accordingly, such individuals will not 
accept a grant.  As a result, for any given proposed values for the individual 
foreign study grants and an overall budget for the government grant 
program, the subset of students actually going abroad can be designated as 
having productivity levels comprised between a lower threshold value, 
s
e ,
and 6, as shown in Figure 4. 
                  Figure 4
Structure of the population for selective merit grants, targeting somewhat less 
capable students
          (1)       (2)      (3)       (4) 
            
       e1       se 6              e        e2
e 
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zone 1 corresponds to individuals for whom the proposed grant is not 
sufficient to convince them to go abroad 
zone 2 corresponds to grant recipients who undertake foreign studies due to 
the grant 
zone 3 corresponds to individuals who do not receive a grant and study at 
home 
zone 4 corresponds to individuals who while not receiving any grant, still 
undertake foreign studies 
Under a selective grant scheme, the variation of welfare generated by 
enabling additional individuals to study abroad, again, results from two 
effects, such that: 
(7)*+--,Ws = ' 
6
se12
ee
N
0 (e) de  + ' 
2
12 ee
N
e
e
0 (e) de  . 
Note that while e -
s
e  is proportional to the amount of the grant, the number 
of beneficiaries is reflected by the productivity interval 6 - 
s
e .  Consequently, 
the educational budgetary constraint can be expressed as: 
(16.)  k( e -
s
e ) (6 - 
s
e ) 8  Fs . 
The maximum value of ,Ws is reached for values of se  and 6 such that se 9
ê1 and 68ê2 .  Otherwise, were se  to be inferior to ê1, it would be possible to 
increase ,Ws by increasing se with 6 constant, while reducing the educational 
budgetary expenditures.  Analogously, if 6 were to be superior to ê2, it would 
be possible to increase ,Ws by decreasing 6 with se constant, while reducing 
again budgetary expenditures.  Nonetheless, a maximum value for ,Ws with 
6 = ê2 may not be feasible since, by construction, it must be the case that 68
e .
If it is assumed that e 9  ê2, then 6 can reach ê2 , which is its 
unconstrained optimal value.  Provided the level of available funds permits 
such a value for 6 and 
s
e , the optimum will then be 6 = ê2 and se = ê1 ,  that is 
if Fs 9  k( e - ê1) (ê2 - ê1) .  If the available public funds are too low, the 
budgetary constraint will be binding and the optimum value of 6 will be 
inferior to ê2.  Yet, in any case the optimal value of 6 will be strictly inferior 
to e .
Instead, if it is assumed that e < ê2 , the constraint 68 e becomes 
binding.  The optimum then corresponds to 6 = e and
s
e = ê1 , conditional on 
the level of funds being large enough, that is if Fs 9  k( e -ê1)
2 .  However, 
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when the budgetary constraint is binding, the maximum value of ,Ws  can be 
determined by taking the derivative of the foregoing expression for the 
change in welfare with respect to 
s
e , such that: 
(17.)  !
,
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ed
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12
ee
N
 
[0 (6)
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ed
d!
 - 0 (
s
e )] .
Along the budget constraint, it follows that: 
(7:*+--6 = 
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ee
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+
s
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s
ed
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=
2
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 + 1 .
It is shown in Appendix 4 that there exists a threshold productivity 
value, 
min
e , and associated intervals of values for e  and Fs , such that ,Ws
has a maximum for some value of 
s
e , where the corresponding 6 is inferior to 
e .  When these conditions are not satisfied, ,Ws is always increasing in se .
Since 6 is always inferior or equal to e , the optimum is associated with the 
maximum value for 
s
e  , which corresponds to 6 = e , and is given by
s
e  = e - k/Fs .  This means that the segment of productivity values [ se , e ] is 
fully covered by the allocation of the grants, while the value of 
s
e  depends on 
the level of the available funds. 
Such a system of restrictive merit grants can now be compared with 
the program of unrestricted merit grants analyzed earlier.  It can first be 
remarked that when 6 = e , the two systems are equivalent, since
s
e  is simply 
being substituted for 
m
e .  As a consequence, an optimal program of 
restricted grants cannot be worse than the unrestricted merit grants in terms 
of overall welfare.  Indeed, the former grant scheme will actually be superior 
when, at the optimum, 6 < e .  In the alternative situation where there is no 
interior optimum, the restricted merit grants are inferior, or at best 
identical, to unrestricted merit grants. 
The foregoing analysis, comparing the two grant programss, can be 
summarized, as follows: 
Proposition 6
When a government has full knowledge regarding students’ abilities, a 
scheme of restrictive merit grants, targeting individuals who are not among the 
most qualified, can dominate a merit scheme, under specific conditions.  In 
particular, the welfare effect of such restricted grants are preferable when 
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either of the following combination of productivity and budgetary conditions 
apply:  either e > ê2 , or e $[ mine , ê2 ] and F $[Fs
1
, Fs
2
].
Section V:  Conclusion
 
 
Certain of the principal insights from this research can now be 
summarized.  First, in general, it is very difficult to assert whether the net 
welfare impact of foreign studies, in the absence of educational grants, will 
be positive or negative. This is due to the non-linearity of welfare effects, 
reflecting associated brain drain and brain gain effects, in relation to the 
distribution of workers’ productivity levels.  Nevertheless, when the 
threshold minimum productivity value, determining whether individuals 
leave, and the maximum attainable for the population of foreign-educated 
students are both relatively average, in comparison with the productivity 
requirements for foreign employment, the net welfare effect resulting from 
foreign human capital formation is positive, i.e. brain gain dominates brain 
drain.  In the foregoing case, welfare is a decreasing function of the threshold 
probability of finding a job abroad, and, thereby, of the investment cost 
differential between foreign and domestic studies.  Welfare is also an 
increasing function of wages paid to foreign-educated skilled workers, 
working in either the home, or foreign labour markets, and a decreasing 
function of wages paid to less-skilled domestic-trained workers at home.  In 
contrast, either very low, or relatively large values for the fore-mentioned 
productivity parameters may generate detrimental welfare effects from 
undertaking foreign studies. Furthermore, the welfare consequences of most 
parameter values are the inverse of what has been observed in the central 
zone, so that, now, brain drain dominates brain gain. 
 The analysis has subsequently examined the efficiency and domestic 
welfare effects of alternative public initiatives, undertaken by a home 
country, which are aimed at assisting students to finance their studies 
abroad.  A consideration of three different grant schemes, with alternative 
assumptions about the extent of a government’s information regarding 
candidates’ underlying abilities, suggests that different foreign-study grant 
schemes are generally efficient and may provide incentives which generate 
an overall positive effect on welfare, provided that the available funds are 
sufficient.  Nonetheless, a number of subtleties, concerning the specific 
conditions under which a specific grant scheme can dominate the other 
schemes, are identified.  More specifically,  with  uniform grants, given the 
asymmetric information between the government and grant recipients, it is 
optimum in most situations to propose relatively smaller amounts of 
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financing to all individuals in the population.    Furthermore, with an 
identical public budget constraint and an average value of the productivity 
threshold without grants ( e ), a merit grant scheme, wherein the 
government can identify the most capable candidates, is superior to a 
program of uniform grants.  Yet, for high enough critical values for the 
productivity threshold and for the availability of public funding, uniform 
grants can generate relatively larger increases in welfare, despite the 
informational asymmetries.   Indeed, when the productivity threshold is 
rather high, a restrictive merit grant scheme, which targets students who are 
not the best candidates, but for whom there is a lower propensity for brain 
drain,  may be the most welfare enhancing, provided the level of available 
funds belongs to some critical interval. 
There are a number of potentially fruitful directions for extending the 
analysis proposed here by incorporating additional modelling features.  
These include admitting the possibility that domestically educated students, 
distinguished by individual abilities and associated educational attainment, 
can seek employment on the foreign labour market.15  A critical 
consideration would then be the differential probability of finding a foreign 
job, which depends on the gap between the productivity distributions for 
home and foreign-educated domestic workers, as well as the specificity of 
training to employment in different countries.  The latter could be captured 
by iceberg effects impacting the degree of convertibility of qualifications 
across labour markets.  Clearly, a further crucial consideration may be the 
extent to which the educational system in the home country enables 
particularly capable students to enhance substantially their productivity 
levels, or, in other words, the extent of educational elitism.  A more detailed 
analysis of the interrelation between alternative educational policies in the 
home country and the extent of brain drain and gain could examine the 
interrelation between the quality of education offered at different 
educational levels, the pricing of such studies and the extent of their 
subsidization – both at home and abroad.  A basic presumption would be 
that there are potential welfare trade-offs between the budgetary expenses of 
improving national educational offerings and  allocating funds for educating 
students abroad, which could depend on the associated net balances between 
brain drain and gain.  An extended framework could also permit an analysis 
of the strategic interactions arising from alternative educational budgetary 
and policy initiatives in both the home and foreign countries.  Alternative 
scenarios relate to the extent of government subsidies, the pricing of tuition 
                                                 
15  Although brain drain and brain gain effects for domestically trained individuals are not explicitly modeled in 
this paper, such an extension is relatively straightforward for the special case where there is a fixed probability of 
being hired abroad and given wage differentials, which do not depend on either individuals’ abilities, or 
productivity levels.  Notably, such an extension would entail incorporating additional constant terms, which do not 
significantly impact the principal qualitative propositions that have been reported. 
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in relation to overall costs for both domestic and foreign students, and the 
overall quality of educational offerings for different educational levels in 
each country.  
In light of well-known market failures for financing investments in 
human capital, initial income distributions could play a critical role in 
determining whether individuals are prepared to study abroad without 
government funding.  Consequently, an additional policy option could be 
analyzed either in the existing modelling framework or a more general 
extension by incorporating alternative hypotheses regarding income and 
asset distributions and introducing unconditional and/or conditional loans 
for less wealthy students.  If educational loans specify that recipients must 
return home to work, they generate only brain gain, thereby enabling 
governments to counter issues of asymmetric information regarding their 
knowledge of individuals’ underlying abilities, since more talented students 
would, ceteris paribus, tend to accept such loans.  Finally, a dynamic 
modelling perspective could highlight how alternative growth paths for the 
home economy depend on the extent of both domestic and foreign human 
capital formation, eventual migration, and endogenous adjustments in 
wages.
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                                                            APPENDIX 1 
Consequences of Alternative Employment Policies in the Foreign Country 
 The analysis here examines the effects of changing the foreign labour 
market requirement parameters, E1 and E2 .  The specific demonstration of 
Proposition 3 starts by considering a comparative static change in E2 , for a 
given value of E1 :  
2dE
Wd, = ';
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; ] .  The foregoing 
expression contains two terms, which can be simplified as follows:   
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and reexpressing the term algebraically it follows that 
p
1
N
ee 12 
2dE
Wd,  = G( e ) – [ e ( 1 - p  ) – C ].  Note that G is a positive decreasing 
function of e  such that G(e2)= 0 .  Consequently, if e2 < 
p-1
C  , 
2dE
Wd, is always 
positive e<  < e2 .  Accordingly, the change in domestic welfare, ,W, is 
always increasing with e , and so also with E2.  However, if e2 > 
p-1
C  , there is 
a threshold value for e  such that beyond this value, ,W is decreasing when 
E2 and e  increase.  Yet, this threshold value may be inferior to e1 , in which 
case ,W is always decreasing with E2 .  Furthermore, qualitatively similar 
results hold for an increase in E1 , or for an increase in both E1 and E2 , 
when, in the latter case, a constant span E2 – E1 is assumed. 
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       APPENDIX 2
                  Uniform Grants
The derivative of the welfare changes, ,Wb , with respect to the 
threshold productivity level for recipients of an uniform grant, 
b
e  , can be 
determined,  as follows: 
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! , shows that along the constraint, 4 is an increasing 
function of 
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If there is a solution to the foregoing equation, it determines the optimum 
value of 
b
e  .  As is subsequently shown, this equation is equivalent to: 
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)e () (e
)E3(E)e(e
2
2
12
2
b2  
 
  !    .
From the latter formulation, it is apparent that such a solution exists only if 
1( e ) > 1(e2) .  However, this  is not a sufficient condition, since be  must 
also be inferior to e , which yields  
ee
)e () (e
)E3(Eee
2
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Essentially, this latter inequality means that the value of e must not be too 
far away from e2 .  If either of these conditions is not met, 
b
b
e
W
;
,;
is always 
positive.  The equivalence of equations (i) and (ii) now needs to be 
demonstrated.  The point of departure is equation (i), which may also be 
written as: 
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Since 1 is a third-degree polynomial in e, it can be further elaborated by 
developing it between 
b
e  and e :
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By substituting the latter expression into equation (iii), it follows that:
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A combination of equations (iv) and (vi), then results in: 
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 2-it is easy to see that equation (vii) is 
equivalent to equation (ii). 
-
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                   APPENDIX 3
      Merit Grants
For given e , in the case of the merit program, the value of F 
determines 
m
e , whereas for given 
b
e  , the value of 4 is given by
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Some mathematical manipulations lead to:
e2 < e2lim( be ) = b
m
m
b
e
)e,e#(
ee
)e,e#( #
 
 .   
Assuming first that e < ê2 , the condition ,Wb > ,Wm then implies that be  < 
m
e .   It will now be shown that e2lim is an increasing function of be for 
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Now, as seen in Appendix 2, on the basis of equation 4, it follows that: 
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Since 0 ’’ is always negative, C is an increasing function of e, for ee 8 .
The derivation of e2lim with regard to be leads to: 
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Since
mb
ee 8 ,-C(
m
e )9 C(
b
e ) and C’(
b
e )9  0 , the derivative is positive, which 
means that e2lim is increasing in be  . 
It follows that e2lim( be )8  e2lim( me ) for mb ee 8< .  However, in this instance 
e2lim( me ) = e and 2ee 8 .  Together, the latter two conditions are 
incompatible with e2 < e2lim( be ), which precludes a relatively larger increase 
in welfare with uniform grants, as compared to a merit scheme, so ,Wb > 
,Wm .
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Now, if e > ê2, there are some values of F for which the maximum 
value of ,Wb is larger than ,Wm . This can be seen by observing that, for 
given
b
e  and e , e2lim becomes infinite for a limiting value of me , mle
(associated with a corresponding limit value Fl of F), such that 1( mle )=1( e )
and
ml
e = e - F/k .  Thus, there is a range of values of 
m
e , inferior to 
ml
e , and 
a range of values of F, superior to Fl , for which e2lim will be superior to e2.
Nonetheless, if the level of funds Fl is very low, the values of be and me will be 
so high that 1(
b
e ) and-1(
m
e ) will be larger than 1(e2).  Accordingly, ,Wb
and ,Wm will both be negative and both grant schemes are inefficient. 
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                     APPENDIX 4
        Restrictive Merit Grants
A starting point for the analysis is the expression of the derivative of 
,Ws with respect to se .  Since the value of the parameter 
12
ee
N
 
does not 
matter here, it can be arbitrarily set equal to 1, in order to simplify the 
notation.  Accordingly, the following expression applies: 
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It can be seen that  
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Wd,
 is positive for 
s
e  = ê1 and negative for se = ê2 .  Of 
particular interest here is the case where e < ê2.  The upper limit value for 6
is, then, e  , which corresponds to 
s
e  = e - k/Fs .  If )e(
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is
negative, ,Ws has a maximum for a value of 6 strictly inferior to e . On the 
contrary, if )e(
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 is still positive, it means that the optimum corresponds 
to the limit value 6 = e .  For 6 = e , one has:  !
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then that !(e) has a maximum for e = E2 /2, it follows that if e #  E2 /2, 
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( e ) is certainly positive.  Actually this is still true, provided  e #
min
e  , where 
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e $[ E2 /2 , ê2 ] is such that ! ( mine ) = 1/2 !%(E2 /2). 
When e $[
min
e , ê2 ], the sign of 
s
s
ed
Wd"
( e ) depends on the value of Fs.
More precisely, this derivative is negative when Fs belongs to an interval [Fs
1,
Fs
2], for which the limits are functions of e , and solutions  of the equation.2 
! ( e ) - ! ( e - k/Fs )= 0.  Furthermore, the higher the value of e , the wider 
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is the interval, which has a maximum for  e =  ê2 , corresponding to Fs
1 = 
0,Fs
2  = k(ê2 - ê1)
2.  This shows also that for e $[
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e , ê2 ]  , all Fs belonging to 
[Fs
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2] meet the condition Fs #  k( e - ê1)
2, while this condition is satisfied 
as an equality only for e = ê2 , and Fs  = Fs
2 .  As a result, when 
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0, the change in welfare, "Ws , has again an interior maximum for values of 
s
e  and & satisfying the equations '
"
s
s
ed
Wd
! (&)[
2
s
s
)ee(
k/F
 
 + 1]- ! (
l
e ) = 0 and k(
e -
s
e ) (& - 
s
e ) = Fs .  When Fs does not belong to the forementioned interval, 
0)e(
ed
Wd
s
s (
"
, so that the maximum value of "Ws corresponds to se  = e -
k/Fs  and & = e .
 
